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STANDING, THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL,
AND EXCLUSIONARY ZONING
Exclusionary zoning,' once called "snob zoning" and assailed for its
elitist foundations, 2 has now attained some degree of respectability in
America.' Under the rubric of "growth control," exclusionary zoning is
seen to have an environmental basis. 4 While zoning for racially discriminatory purposes is unquestionably illegal,5 not all forms of exclusionary
zoning have been held unconstitutional. 6 One such form which has apparently escaped Supreme Court scrutiny is that which has no effect
other than the establishment of an artificial limit on population ingress. 7
The recent proliferation of this mode of land use control raises significant constitutional questions, especially in light of one's "right to
travel."'8
1. "Exclusionary zoning" is a phrase popularly used to describe suburban zoning
regulations which have the effect, if not also the purpose, of preventing the migration of low and middle-income persons. Since a large percentage of racial minorities fall within the low and middle income brackets, exclusionary zoning regulations
may also effectively wall out racial minorities.
Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897, 905 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975).
2. Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767, 781-82 (1969). See also Note, Snob Zoning: A Look at the
Economic and Social Impact of Low Density Zoning, 15 Syx. L. Rav. 507 (1964).
3. See Note, The Right to Travel and Community Growth Controls, 12 HAnv. J.
LEGIs. 244 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Right to Travel].
4. Id.
5. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking
Org. v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291 (9th Cir. 1970).
6. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). Most exclusionary
zoning cases involve challenges to so-called traditional zoning devices. See Note, The
Right to Travel and Exclusionary Zoning, 26 HASTNGS L.J. 849 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Exclusionary Zoning]; Note, Freedom of Travel and Exclusionary Land Use
Regulations, 84 YALE L.J. 1564, 1572 n.28 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Freedom of
Travel].
7. In the most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on zoning, the Court had the
opportunity to pass on the constitutionality of an ordinance which had the effect of
limiting population, but declined to do so by deciding the case on different grounds. See
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (plaintiffs denied standing to challenge
exclusionary zoning); note 23 infra. In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1
(1974), the Court was confronted with a zoning ordinance which restricted land-use to
single family dwellings but did not put a ceiling on the number of such dwellings and
consequently did not absolutely limit the population. See Freedom of Travel, supra note
6, at 1574 n.36. But see Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897,
907 (9th Cir. 1975).
8. The so-called constitutional right to travel has a controversial and murky basis. A
recent law review article noted:
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In Construction Industry Association of Sonoma County v. City of

Petaluma,9 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld, against constitutional attack, an exclusionary zoning ordinance, the sole effect of which
was to impose such an artificial limit on population growth.1" In finding
that the ordinance did not violate either the due process1 or commerce
clauses' 2 of the United States Constitution, the circuit court refused to
consider the plaintiffs' claim that the zoning ordinance violated any right
to travel, on the ground that the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert such

a claim.
The court's holding with regard to plaintiffs' standing has far reaching implications, both as to the legality of exclusionary zoning and the
nature and extent of the constitutional right to travel. The position of the
court may foreshadow a policy of judicial restraint in reviewing excluright to travel in the
opinions of the Supreme Court: the "penumbra" of the first amendment, the equal
protection clause, the due process clauses, the commerce clause, the privileges and
immunities clause of Article IV, and the privileges and immunities clause of the
fourteenth amendment.
Comment, A Strict Scrutiny of the Right to Travel, 22 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1129, 1140-41
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Strict Scrutiny]. Nor is it certain that the right to travel
must have a basis in a constitutional clause in order to give it constitutional effect. The
Supreme Court, in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), stated: 'e have no
occasion to ascribe the source of this right. . . to a particular constitutional provision."
Id. at 630. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), Justice Harlan referred to the
right as a "nebulous judicial construct." Id. at 216. See Sosna v. Iowa, 95 S.Ct. 553
(1975); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein,
405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (1941) (Douglas, J., concurring). See also Right to Travel, supra
note 3; Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 6; Comment, The Right to Travel and Its
Application to Restrictive Housing Laws, 66 Nw. U.L. REv. 635 (1971) [hereinafter
cited as Housing Laws]; Freedom of Travel, supra note 6.
9. 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975).
10. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574, 581 (N.D. Cal.
1974), rev'd on other grounds, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975). Nowhere in the Circuit
Court opinion was this finding disputed. Quite the contrary, in its analysis of the zoning
ordinance on due process grounds, the Ninth Circuit referred to this finding, and stated
that their task was to "determine .. .whether the exclusion bears any rational relationship to a legitimate state interest." 522 F.2d at 906. See notes 29-37 infra and
accompanying text.
While an allegation of racial discrimination would have invoked a strict scrutiny
standard and perhaps -thereby produced a different result (see Warth v. Seldin, 95 S.Ct.
2197, 2203 n.3 (1975); Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897,
906 n.11 (9th Cir. 1975); Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 253-54
(9th Cir. 1975)) the absence of such an allegation in this case made it unnecessary to
consider the Petaluma Plan's effect other than as imposing an artificial ceiling on population growth.
11. 522 F.2d at 905-09.
12. Id. at 909.

[lt is possible to find at least six distinct sources for the
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sionary zoning, requiring only that such enactments be justified by
showing a "rational relationship" to a legitimate state interest. At the
very least, when juxtaposed against the district court opinion, which had
found that the zoning ordinance violated the right to travel, the ruling is
another indication that the courts view the right to travel as less than
"fundamental.' 1
The City of Petaluma, a commuting distance of forty miles from the
San Francisco Bay Area, "was drawn into the metropolitan housing
market as people. . . became willing to commute longer distances to
secure relatively inexpensive housing available [in Petaluma]."" In
response to the rapid expansion of its population, the city instituted a
moratorium on housing development and subsequently devised the Petaluma Plan (the Plan) to control and regulate future growth, and to
"protect the small town characteristics" of the city. The Plan limited
developmental growth to a rate of 500 dwelling units per year for five
years, but exempted all projects of four units or less. 1" It was assumed
that this limitation was less than the "reasonably anticipated market
demand for such units and that absent the Petaluma Plan, the city would
grow at a faster rate."'"
-The Plan was challenged on constitutional grounds by two classes of
plaintiffs: the Builders Association of Sonoma County, an association of
builders and developers, and two individual landowners, whose property
was not entirely within the boundaries of Petaluma. The district court,
finding that the Plan had infringed upon the right to travel,17 demanded
13. See Soma v. Iowa, 95 S. Ct. 553 (1975); text accompanying notes 38-50 infra.
14. 522 F.2d at 900.
15. Id. at 902.
16. Id. The circuit court noted that the Plan would allow the population of
Petaluma to increase at a rate of 1500 persons, or six per cent per year. Id. at 908 n.15.
Furthermore, while slowing the growth rate, the Plan "replacetd] the past pattern of
single-family detached homes with an assortment of housing units, varying in price and
design." Id. at 905 n.10.
17. Although the district court relied solely on the right to travel claim for invalidating the Petaluma Plan, the circuit court, by denying standing, declined to reach this
issue. But, the court did state that the "Plan is not aimed at transients, nor does it
penalize those who have recently exercised their right to travel." 522 F.2d 897, 907 n.13,
citing CEEED v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Comm'n, 43 Cal. App. 3d 306,
330-32, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315, 332-34 (1974). However, CEEED, like Petaluma, involved
the issue of the right to travel intrastate, and as the CEEED court recognized, "the
Supreme Court has not yet decided whether the right [to travel] encompasses intrastate
travel." 43 Cal. App. 3d at 331, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 333.
By its statement regarding the right to travel and its citation to CEEED, the Ninth
Circuit seems to acknowledge the proposition that the right to travel applies to intrastate
as well as to interstate travel. Such a result has been reached by the Second Circuit in
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that the local government show a compelling state interest to justify the
enactment of the ordinance. The city officials had alleged that both the
limited water supply and sewage facilities required the artificial ceiling
on land development and population growth. The district court respond-

ed by stating that the city could, as reasonable alternatives to population
8
control, increase the supply of water and improve the sewage system.'

In reversing, the appellate court held that the plaintiffs had no
standing to assert a right to travel claim as it relates to zoning.' 9 Initially
the court recognized that the test of standing involved a two-fold inquiry. First, it had to be determined whether the plaintiff had met the
"case or controversy" limitation imposed by article III. The court stated

that this constitutional requirement is satisified by showing either that
one "has a 'personal stake in the outcome of the controversy,"' 2 0 or "has

suffered 'some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively
illegal action."' 2' Second,
the plaintiff must satisfy the additional court-imposed standing requirement that the "interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the
statute or constitutional guarantee in question."22
As to this latter requirement, the court found that the plaintiffs had
not sustained their burden. The Court relied on Warth v. Seldin,23
King v. New Rochelle 'Municipal 'Housing Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648 (1971). For
purposes of this note, it will be assumed that the right to travel encompasses both
intrastate and interstate travel
18. The defendants contended that in order to increase both water and sewage systems
a bond sale must be approved by the electorate and consequently the court is without
power to dictate the results of such a referendum. The court responded simply: "Neither
Petaluma city officials, nor the local electorate may use their power to disapprove bonds
at the polls as a weapon to define or destroy fundamental constitutional rights." 375 F.
Supp. at 583.
19. The court summarily disposed of the defendant's objections to the district court's
jurisdiction to entertain a suit for injunctive relief brought against city officials. The
Court stated:
[A] city official is a "person" within the meaning of § 1983 and . . .a district
court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343 over an action to enjoin him from
enforcing an unconstitutional statute.
522 F.2d at 903 citing, Ybarra v. Town of Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250, 253 (9th Cir.
1974). The court also noted that jurisdiction was proper under the general federal
question statute. Id.
20. Id. at 903, quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
21. Id., quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 (1973).
22. Id., quoting Association of Data Processing Service Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 153 (1970) (emphasis added).
23. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). In Warth, the City of Penfield, New York, enacted a
zoning ordinance which had the effect of limiting the construction of low-cost housing.
The ordinance was attacked on several constitutional grounds, including the right to
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wherein it was stated that "the plaintiff. . . must assert his own legal
rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights
or interests of third parties. 24 The Petaluma court concluded that the
right to travel was
asserted not on the [plaintiffs'] own behalf, but on behalf of a group
of unknown third parties allegedly excluded from living in Petaluma.
Although [the plaintiffs] are admittedly adversely affected by the Peta-

luma Plan, their economic interests are undisputedly outside the zone
of interest to be protected by any right to travel. Accordingly, [plaintiffs'] right to travel claim "falls squarely within the prudential standing

rule that normally bars litigants from asserting the rights or legal interests of others in order to obtain relief from injury to themselves. 21 r
While the court recognized that several exceptions to this general rule
exist, it held that the plaintiffs did not fall within any of them. Specifically, the plaintiffs could not rely on any congressional statute authorizing them to assert the rights of others;26 nor was there any "special ongoing relationship between [plaintiffs] and those whose rights allegedly
[were] violated which militate[d] in favor of granting standing";2 7 nor

did the plaintiffs show that "their prosecution of the suit [was] necestravel. The plaintiffs consisted of: (1) a non-profit corporation whose purposes were to
foster action to alleviate the housing shortage for low-and-moderate income persons in
the Rochester [New York] area (id. at 494); (2) several individual Rochester taxpayers
(id.); and (3) several Rochester residents of low-and-moderate incomes who allegedly
were precluded from moving into Penfield because the zoning ordinances prevented the
construction of housing easily affordable to low-and-moderate income persons (id.).
The individual taxpayers alleged that refusal to allow low-income residency in Penfield
put an undue burden upon the taxpayers of Rochester, thereby producing an injury in
fact. However, the Court held that these taxpayers had failed to overcome the case or
controversy barrier and were denied standing. After thus denying standing, the Court
went on to state that even if an injury in fact had been sustained, prudential considerations would bar standing to litigate the issue. Id. at 509-10.
The corporate plaintiff claimed standing for its members who were excluded from
Penfield as well as nine percent of its members who lived in Penfield and were "deprived
of the benefits of living in a racially and ethnically integrated community." Id. at 512.
Standing was denied for the corporation's Penfield members because no racial discrimination was alleged. The failure to allege racial discrimination, the Court held, made
inapplicable the principle that would allow residents of housing projects "an actionable
right to be free from the adverse consequences to them of racially discriminatory
practices directed at and immediately harmful to others." Id. at 513 citing Trafficante
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972). The complaint in Petaluma was
similarly devoid of any allegation of racial discrimination. See also note 10 supra; notes
33 & 36 infra.
24. 422 U.S. at 499, quoted in 522 F.2d at 903.
25. 522 F.2d at 904, quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 499, 509.
26. Id., citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188-89 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 421 (1965).
27. Id., citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 458-60 (1958).
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sary to ensure protection of the rights asserted.

28

Having determined that the plaintiffs lacked standing to assert a
violation of the right to travel, the court then considered the plaintiffs'
claim that "the plan [was] arbitrary and unreasonable and, thus, violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2' 9 In its
analysis the Court applied the principle established by the Supreme
Court in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 30 wherein it was stated

that a zoning ordinance would not be judicially overturned unless it
could be shown that it was not rationally related to any of a broad range

of police power objectives."
At the outset it was recognized that the Plan's purpose was to
preserve "Petaluma's small town character" and to avoid "the social and

environmental problems caused by an uncontrolled growth rate."

2

It

was further noted that while the present zoning ordinance had an

exclusionary effect, all zoning to some extent excludes certain persons.3

Thus, the Court focused on whether the exclusion had any rational

relationship to a legitimate state interest.
In view of the Ninth Circuit's prior decision in Ybarra v. Town of Los
Altos Hills3 4 it was virtually a foregone conclusion that the Petaluma

Plan would be sustained against a due process attack. In Ybarra, a
zoning ordinance,"' which admittedly had the effect of preventing low

income individuals from residing within the municipality, was upheld
over challenges both on equal protection s6 and due process grounds. In
28. Id., citing Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969); NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257
(1953). See text accompanying notes 52-64 infra.
29. 522 F.2d at 905.
30. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
31. See Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 6, at 850.
32. 522 F.2d at 906.
33. Id. In so stating, the court made clear that it was not confronted with the
issue of discriminatory zoning:
Our inquiry here is not unlike that involved in a case alleging denial of equal
protection of the laws. The mere showing of some discrimination by the state is
not sufficient to prove an invasion of one's constitutional rights. Most legislation
to some extent discriminates between various classes of persons, business enterprises, or other entities. However, absent a suspect classification or invasion of
fundamental rights, equal protection rights are violated only where the classification
does not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.
Id. n.l 1 (emphasis added). See note 10 supra.
34. 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974).
35. The ordinance provided "that a housing lot shall contain not less than one acre
and that no lot shall be occupied by more than one primary dwelling unit." 503 F.2d at
252.
36. Although the plaintiffs in Ybarra did not assert that the ordinance discriminated
on the basis of race, they contended that it discriminated against the poor, thereby
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Petaluma, as in Ybarra, the court concluded that "the concept of the
public welfare is sufficiently broad to uphold [a city's] desire to preserve its small town character, its open spaces and low density of
' 7
population, and to grow at an orderly and deliberate pace."
These cases underscore that, in the Ninth Circuit, an exclusionary
zoning ordinance challenged on due process grounds, will not be invalidated as long as it fosters some legitimate state interest. The fact that preservation of Petaluma's and Los Altos' rural environments was found to
be such an interest makes it difficult, if not impossible, to successfully
challenge exclusionary zoning on any ground which invokes a "rational
requiring the town to "show a compelling interest to justify the ordinance." Id. at 253. In
rejecting this contention, the court relied on San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973), wherein itwas stated:
The individuals, or groups of individuals, who constituted the class discriminated
-against in our prior cases shared two distinguishing characteristics: because of their
impecunity they were completely unable to pay for some desired benefit, and as a
consequence, they sustained an absolute deprivation of a meaningful opportunity to
enjoy that benefit.
Id. at 20.
In applying this "two-part" test in Ybarra, the Ninth Circuit found that while the
plaintiffs met the first criterion in that their poverty prevented them from living in Los
Altos, they did not meet the second criterion, by failing to show that
they had no "meaningful opportunity" to obtain low-cost housing. The evidence
showed that no poor people live or work in Los Altos. Appellants failed to show
that adequate low-cost housing was unavailable elsewhere in Santa Clara County
in areas accessible to appellant's jobs and social services. In these circumstances
the town need not show a compelling interest to justify a zoning ordinance which
discriminates against the poor.
503 F.2d at 254. Thus, within the Ninth Circuit, it appears that unless county-wide
zoning provides for low cost housing, these plaintiffs, and others similarly situated, will
be denied a "meaningful opportunity to enjoy" the benefits derived from living in a
particular area.
Compare the Ybarra court's reasoning with that of the district court in Petaluma that
"'local police power may [not] be used to shift the burden of providing housing to other
cities in a metropolitan region which have their own problems."' 375 F. Supp. at 587,
quoting Brief for Plaintiff at 7. Note also the statement of the Supreme Court in Warth
v. Seldin that there is no right for the taxpayers of one city to "be free of action by a
neighboring municipality that may have some incidental adverse effect.

. .

."

422 U.S.

at 509. For an examination of the type of problems involved with extra-municipal
zoning, see Comment, Land-Use Control, Externalities, and the Municipal Affairs
Doctrine: A Border Conflict, 8 LoY. L.A.L. REv. 432 (1975).
Further, the Ybarra court may have foreshadowed the Petaluma court's reluctance to
accept an infringement of the right to travel in zoning cases. In construing CAL. Gov'T
CODE ANN. § 65302 (West 1970), "which requires towns to adopt housing plans" that
adequately provide "for the housing needs of all economic segments of the community,"
the court stated:
We believe that the section requires a town to provide housing for its residents but
does not require it to provide housing for non-residents, even though the non-residents may live in the broader urban community of which the town is a part.
503 F.2d at 254.
37. 522 F.2d at 908-09.
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relation" test. Therefore, plaintiffs contesting exclusionary zoning ordinances must allege the violation of constitutional rights reviewed under
standards stricter than the due process "rational relation" test.
The right to travel which the Petaluma plaintiffs attempted to assert
would appear to invoke this standard of review. In Shapiro v.
Thompson,38 Dunn v. Blumstein,3 9 and Memorial Hosptial v. Maricopa
County,4 0 the Supreme Court formulated the test to be applied in cases
involving an infringement of the right to travel. The Court indicated that
the state must establish the existence of a compelling interest to justify
such infringement. 41 Two subsequent cases, however, appear to have
refined this standard.
In Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas,42 a zoning ordinance restricted
land use to single family dwellings or to occupancy by not more than
two unrelated persons. The Court passed over the plaintiffs' right to
travel claim because "Belle Terre's interference with free settlement was
trifling. . .. -43 In upholding the ordinance the Court "continued to
reject implications which might have been drawn from cases such as
Shapiro or Dunn that any interference with settlement requires strict
scrutiny."44 Thus, the Court's language, if not its decision, seems to
indicate that it will look to the extent of the infringement in determining
what standard of review will be applied.
In Sosna v. Iowa,4 5 the Supreme Court reviewed the validity of a
durational residency requirement imposed as a prerequisite to obtaining
a marital dissolution. The Court acknowledged that Shapiro, Dunn, and
Maricopainvolved more than an infringement upon the right to travel. 48
In each case an individual had been denied some benefit related to
another right. 47 Consequently the Sosna Court concluded that only
38. 394 U.S. 618 (1964).

39. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
40. 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
41. The district court in Petaluma, relying on Dunn, recognized the right to travel as

fundamental, without seriously questioning the plaintiffs' standing to assert it. As such,
the court demanded a showing of a compelling interest to justify the ordinance. 375 F.
Supp.at 574.
42. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
43. Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 6, at 869.
44. Id.
45. 95 S. Ct. 553 (1975).
46. Id. at 560-61.
47. The penalty imposed upon those exercising the right to travel has varied: Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1964), involved denial of welfare benefits; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), involved denial of right to vote; and Memorial Hosp. v.
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insofar as the state action infringed upon another right would a compelling state interest be required as justification.48 When exclusionary
zoning infringes solely on the right to travel, the only benefit denied is
the ability to obtain housing in the zoned area. However, since the right
to housing has not been accorded the same protection49 as the other
rights in Shapira, Dunn, and Maricopa, an infringement on the right to
travel which only denies access to housing will not invoke the compelling state interest test. Nonetheless, the Court, in dealing with a
durational residency requirement in Sosna, focused on the state interest
necessary to justify an action infringing solely on the right to travel. The
Court's analysis indicates that it still requires more than a mere rational
relationship.50
To the extent that a violation of one's right to travel invokes a
standard more stringent than a rational relationship, plaintiffs who can
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974), involved denial of medical care. In all three
cases, the benefits were denied to those who had recently exercised their right to travel.
48. See 95 S. Ct. at 561, 562.
49. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
50. In discussing the state interest necessary to justify the Iowa residency requirement
the Court noted that the state was not relying solely on "budgetary or record keeping
considerations." 95 S. Ct. at 561. A divorce decree, according to the Court, involves
more than the specific relief requested by a plaintiff. It also affects both property rights
and possible minor children outside the forum state. Consequently, a state interest
sufficient to justify the infringement on the right to travel existed in the form of
"avoiding officious intermeddling in matters in which another state has a paramount
interest, and in minimizing the susceptibility of its own divorce decree to collateral
attack." Id. To the extent the Sosna Court was not relying solely on "budgetary and
record keeping considerations" to justify the residency requirement, it can be inferred
that the Court invoked a standard of review stricter than that of a mere rational
relationship.
Furthermore, the Court cited Kahn v, Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974), for support of its
statement that the "residency requirement may reasonably be justified on grounds other
than purely budgetary considerations or administrative convenience." Id. Kahn involved
a challenge on equal protection grounds to a state tax exemption accorded to individuals
on the basis of sex. The Court upheld the exemption as not violative of equal protection
in that, unlike its earlier decision in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), the
special consideration was not based solely on administrative reasons. 416 U.S. at 355. It
has been recognized that the Court's approach when dealing with charges of sex
discrimination involves a "middle-ground" test, i.e., enactments that discriminate on the
basis of sex are examined in light of a standard falling somewhere between a rational
relationship and a compelling state interest test. See, Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971
Term-Forward:In Search of Evolving Doctrine on A Changing Court: A Model for a
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HAv. L. REv. 1 (1972); Note, The Emerging Bifurcated
Standard for Classifications Based on Sex, 1975 DuKn L.J. 163; Developments in the
Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1065 (1969). The use of Kahn for support in
Sosna would indicate that the Court is using a like standard in examining infringements
on the right to travel.
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successfully allege a violation of their right to travel might be able to
challenge a zoning ordinance which only excludes individuals from the
zoned area. However, the circuit court opinion in Petaluma, when

analyzed with Warth may foreclose any such challenge. If so, exclusionary zoning may never be subject to more than a rational relation test

and, therefore, would rarely, if ever, be invalidated.' 1 An examination of
the Petaluma courfs reasoning with regard to standing leads one to

believe that an almost insurmountable barrier faces a plaintiff seeking to
assert a violation of the right to travel in exclusionary zoning cases.
A preliminary discussion of the district court's view of standing to

assert the right to travel illustrates the problem inherent in the circuit
court analysis. The district court stated simply that "it was not necessary

. . . that the plaintiffs' introduce any evidence relating to any individual
who was actually excluded by the plan. '52 Thus, the plaintiffs were
granted standing on the mere allegation that the Plan infringed on the

"people's right to travel." 53

In support of its opinion, the district court relied on Shapiro, Dunn,
and Maricopa.In those cases the Supreme Court held that the standing
requirements were not a bar to challenges to durational residency requirements that infringed on the right to travel, even though the plain-

tiffs were not deterred from traveling. Under the authority of those
cases, a plaintiff subject to a durational residency requirement is allowed

to assert an infringement of his right to travel notwithstanding the fact
that he has already moved into the area, provided he has suffered some

"penalty" in the exercise of his right. 4 The use of the "penalty criterion"
51. See, e.g., Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974); Ybarra v. Town of
Los Altos Hills, 503 F.2d 250 (9th Cir. 1974); Steel Hill Development Inc. v. City of
Sanborton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972). See also notes 29-37 and accompanying text
supra. But note the pronounced predilection of the state courts to strike down exclusionary zoning ordinances on the basis of the rational relationship standard of review under
the due process clause. See Freedom of Travel, supranote 6, at 1576. In the district court
decision in Petaluma, Judge Burke cited several Pennsylvania cases holding that not only
was the state's reliance on the zoning power misplaced, but use of zoning in such an
exclusionary manner was simply not in the general welfare. 375 F. Supp. 586. See
Appeal of Kit Mart Builders, 268 A.2d 765 (Pa. 1970); National Land & Inv. Co. v.
Kohn, 215 A.2d 597 (Pa. 1966); Bilbar Const. v. Board of Adjustment, 141 A.2d 851
(Pa. 1958). Simply stated, the position of the Pennsylvania courts is that "[zloning is a
means by which a governmental body can plan for the future--it may not be used as a
means to deny the future." National Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 215 A.2d 597, 610 (Pa.
1966).
52. 375 F. Supp. at 581.
53. Id.
54. See note 47 supra. In Shapiro, Dunn and Maricopa, the Supreme Court rejected
standing arguments that would have barred the plaintiffs from challenging durational
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is thus an easing of the standing requirements. The district court in
Petaluma utilized this penalty criterion in granting standing and found
there is "no meaningful distinction between a law which penalizes the
exercise of a right and one which denies it altogether." 5 5
The trial court was mistaken, however, in its application of the
penalty criterion. In Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopa the issue was never
raised as to whether the plaintiffs had met the zone of interest requirement. Since each of the plaintiffs already had moved, the issue in those
cases involved the first test of standing, i.e., an injury in fact. Generally,
the Supreme Court found a "lesser" showing of infringement on the
plaintiffs' "in-migration" was sufficient to meet this test. In Petaluma,
however, there was no showing of any infringement upon the plaintiffs'
right to travel; thus, the plaintiffs did not fall within the zone of interests. 6 The failure to recognize this critical factual distinction gave rise to
a misunderstanding by the district court of the penalty analysis. The
circuit court therefore may have been correct in reversing the district
court decision. However, its own analysis may also be faulty, and the
end result erroneous.
The crux of the divergence between the two decisions is whether the
zone of interest rule is applicable when a plaintiff seeks to assert a
violation of another's right to travel. The circuit court found that none
of the recognized exceptions to the zone of interest rule applied. 7 It can
be assumed that the court was correct in its statements that no statute
granted plaintiffs standing to assert the rights of others, and that no
sufficient relationship existed between plaintiffs and those whose rights
were abridged.5 8 However, its conclusion that the plaintiffs need not
bring suit to ensure protection of the rights asserted is less certain.
0
The circuit court relied on Sullivan v. Little Huntington Park,"

residency requirements. As pointed out by the Court in Dunn, "none of the litigants had
themselves been deterred" from traveling because of the challenged statute, but the Court
also noted that the need to make such an allegation to obtain standing "represents a
fundamental misunderstanding of the law." 405 U.S. at 340, 339.
55. 375 F. Supp. at 582. One commentator has mirrored this reasoning by stating that
"[k]eeping outsiders out altogether must be considered at least as constitutionally suspect
as letting them in but treating them worse for a while." Right to Travel, supra note 6, at
263.
56. Thus, a "correct" analysis of the penalty rule would say that the zone of interest
requirement can be met only if the plaintiff's right to travel is deterred or penalized.
57. See text accompanying note 26-28 supra.
58. See note 54 supra.
59. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
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NAACP v. Alabama,60 and Barrows v. Jackson.61 Each of these cases
stands for the proposition that prudential standing considerations, mere
"rle[s] of practice,"" 2 will not act as a bar to plaintiffs seeking to assert
the rights of others if such rights would not otherwise be vindicated.
Thus, the validity of the court's analysis depends on the correctness of its
assumption that in Petaluma "those individuals whose mobility is impaired may bring suit on their own behalf and on behalf of those
similarly situated."63
It is questionable whether in fact these individuals could assert a
violation of their right to travel. Under Petaluma and Warth, the only
persons who can meet the zone of interest test, when challenging exclusionary zoning ordinances as violative of their right to travel, are those
who can establish a causal relationship between the zoning ordinance
and their alleged exclusion. Similarly, such a casual link is the sole
mode of establishing any injury in fact.
The Petalumacircuit court's failure to comment on the district court's
decision is an implicit rejection of any application of the Dunn penalty
analysis in establishing an injury in fact. This may be explained by the
fact that even though exclusionary zoning may simply act to preclude
migration into an area, once a person has obtained residency in the
zoned area his right to travel is not infringed in any way. In each case
where the penalty analysis has been applied, the plaintiffs, after moving,
had been denied some benefits accorded to others within the same area.
Exclusionary zoning, if it works as a penalty, does so only in the sense of
preventing one from moving into the area in the first instance. 4 ,
That the circuit court's reasoning in Petaluma is shared by the Supreme Court is implicit in Warth. There, the court refused to allow
standing to persons who alleged that they had been excluded by the
ordinance. The Court held that a mere allegation of harm in the
complaint, which should be deemed true for pleading purposes, 65 was
insufficient "to support an actionable causal relationship between [the]
60. 357 U.S.449 (1958).
61. 346 U.S.249 (1953).
62. Id. at 257. "[M~e believe the reasons which underlie our rule denying standing to
raise another's rights, which is only a rule of practice, are outweighed by the need to
protect... fundamental rights...." Id.
63. 522 F.2d at 904.
64. This view was adopted by the Petaluma district court. See text accompanying note
55 supra.
65. 422 U.S. at 502.
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zoning practices and the petitioner's asserted injury." 6 Warth rejected
as sufficient the alleged desire and attempt of those excluded individuals
to obtain housing in the zoned area. Stating instead that the plaintiffs
must allege facts from which it reasonably could be inferred that, absent
the . . . restrictive zoning practices, there is a substantial probability
that they would have been able to purchase or lease . . . and that if

the court affords the relief requested, the asserted inability of petitioners
67
will be removed.
In construing this language, the Ninth Circuit stated:
Although Warth v. Seldin denied standing to a group of low-income and
minority-group plaintiffs challenging exclusionary zoning practices, the
case is no bar to a suit against the City brought by a proper group of
plaintiffs. The Court in Warth v. Seldin, left open the federal court
doors for plaintiffs who have some interest in a particular housing project and who, but for the restrictive zoning ordinances, would be able
68
to reside in the community.
Under this analysis, the determinative question is what interest is
sufficient. Traditionally, standing to challenge zoning ordinances lies
only in -those who have a property interest affected by the ordinance.09
Consequently, it has been held that one who is deterred from settling
does not suffer the requisite injury in fact unless he is a party to a
contract for the sale of land affected by the ordinances. 7° And it follows
that such a contractual relationship will be effectively precluded by a
zoning ordinance prohibiting building or migration. Thus, under this
standard, the only person who would have standing is one who was a
contract-vendee for the purchase of land prior to the enactment of the
ordinance.
There is language in Warth, however, indicating that standing will be
accorded to those who, although not having a "contractual interest in a
particular project," 71 can demonstrate that "he personally would benefit
in a tangible way from the court's intervention." 72 Insofar as this provides standing to persons who would not be granted standing under the
traditional rules, Warth might represent a relaxation of the requirements
66. Id. at 507.
67. Id. at 504.
68. 522 F.2d at 904-05.
69. Note, Towards Liberalizing Requirements for Standing in Zoning Litigation-

Approximation of the Public Welfare, 5 ME mIs ST. U.L. Rnv. 251, 254-55 (1974).
70. Id. at 255.
71. 422 U.S. at 508 n.18.
72. Id. at 508.

1975]

NINTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

for plaintiffs seeking to challenge zoning ordinances. However, the
practical import of such a relaxation is lost by the Court's refusal to
"identify in the abstract '73 exactly what allegations would suffice to
establish that the plaintiff would benefit from the court's intervention.
CONCLUSION

Petaluma represents the first case in which the right to travel as
developed in Shapiro, Dunn, and Maricopawas attempted to be applied
to exclusionary zoning.74 The Ninth Circuit decision, however, has
virtually precluded judicial consideration of whether an infringement on
the right to travel will invalidate exclusionary zoning ordinances. An
individual excluded from a zoned area seeking to invalidate the zoning
ordinance by asserting a deprivation of his right to travel, is required to
show either an additional infringement on some judicially protected
right,7 5 or an absolute causal relationship between the ordinance and the
deprivation of the right to travel. However, until such time as the Warth
standard is clarified, such an individual cannot be certain what allegations, if any, will establish that requisite causal relationship. 71 Consequently, in the interim, a due process rational relation standard of review will continue to uphold virtually all exclusionary zoning ordinances
challenged in federal court no matter what may be their incidental social
effects.
Gregory D. Bistline

73. Id. at n.18.
74. See Right to Travel, supra note 6, at 247.
75. See text accompanying notes 38-50 supra. See also notes 10, 23, 33, & 36 supra.
76. Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit has allowed liberal standing in environmental
suits. The court has allowed plaintiffs standing upon a singular showing of a "sufficient
geographical nexus . .. to the project", thereby making immaterial the showing of an
economic or quantifiable injury. See City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661 (9th Cir.
1975). It is questionable, therefore, whether a more stringent standing requirement
should be imposed in exclusionary zoning cases on the theory that the court would otherwise subject itself to inundation by these cases.

